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With a focus placed on cost allocation,a new approach has been presented in this
paper This new approach which makes fun use of a nlicrOcomputer linked、vith a
co10r monitor is intended to play a role of spanning over a gap betlveen the normative
type of approach as most of the conventional rnethods developed for cOst alocation,
and the empirical type of apprOach as kno、vn by the n me of gaming,「Γh ugh it is
empirical and learning‐oriented in the way it operates, this new apprOach may be
strictly differenitated from ganaing in commOn terms, o4/ing tO the former's Special
structure characterized by the built‐in asic normalities So the approach Mras
designed to serve for both education and problem‐finding
Ciose study of the results of experilalents has clearly demonstrated that it serves for
the intended purposes The power of the introduced microcomputer systenl has been
discussed in detail. Sklggestion is made of the needed further ilmprovements of the
presented apprOach
1.Introduction
ln the fiekl of water resources management,there have been mounting concerns about how
to reconcile conflicting interests among the different paコしies involved. Among a variety of
conflict problems is the well known probleFrl:hOw to split the total costs of a joint proiect
among different users.This problem,which is generally called“cost aliocatio "is the major
concern of this paper.
The water resoばces field has extettive literature on this theme. Many approaches have
been proposed, tested and modified therein, and some of them appear to have gained
exten?ve publicity and appHcation in ttlis field. The most conspicuous among thena is the
Separable Cost Remaining Benefit(SCRB)MethOd. This method,whose origin dates back
to the early 1950's when a subcom∬?ttee of the Federal lnteragency River Basin Committee
recommended the SCRB,has been further developed in other countries to constitute the legal
basis of present ccjst allocation procedures.  In Japan it is prescribed by law that the
a1location of costs should principany be performed by applying the SCRB―ased proc ure.
Though it is so widely applied,both heoretical and ernpirical stu?es have shown that
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SCRB has some crucial drawbacks and inconsistencies Among them is the criticisln thatthe
conventional rneth6d including SCRB fail to handle the bargaining feature of cost allocation
has provoked the development of a new approach in the water resources field,「Γhis apprOach
Owes its theoretical basis to what has been developed as the theory of cooperative galnes. It
、vas not qtlite recently,however,that a systematic assessment was made of the imphcations
and apphcability of a cluster of game theoretic methods for the cost allocation in water
resollrces management. Froni the viewpoint of eq?ty and fa r and coHllnOn sense,Young,
Okada,and】■ashirnotol)'2)haVe identified a set of basic principles that ought to be embodied
in cost allocation,have then proceeded to a systematic check of both conventional and ganie
theoretic methods against the basic principles.  They concluded that the conventional
methodb including S()RB and some garxle theoretic methods fail to satisfy some of the basic
principles and only a couple of lesser knoM′n m thods frOnュ gal e theory; i e the Weak
Nucleolus(WN)and the PrOportional Nucleolus(PN),prOved tO be lllore appropriate, These
points Mrere llltstrated by thdr application to a cost allocation problem among a group of
Swedish mu?cipahties developing a joint llmnicipal water supply
The development of the above study has mptivated another type of approach. Stah17)haS
implemellted an empirical approach called`菅だhillg"to the Sw ish cost allocation problem.
He claimed that any allocation method based on preselected norms may not be accepted by
participants. His approach was characterized by his position that the participants ought to
be given as much free hand as possible in their bargaining、vith the others to find a final
compronlise. Invlte players to the same table and let them play Mrith the others,given a set
of cost data on``going alone"and``goillg together". This was his idea.
Okada3)pOinted out that the extent to which a cost allocation lnethod has application lnay
largely depend on the level or scope in、vhich c st allocation is discussed and so there cannot
be only one allocation method but rather many. He clairned that if a cost anOcation enters
in the proieCt implementation phase as is commonly the case it becomes no mOre than a
financial analysis and so demands a normative approach.  A(予nittedly, here is anot er
extreme situation in which empirical approach finds applcation. Suppose there has not yet
been any established cost anOcation procedure whatsoever and One desires to pick up those
rules or norms which patter?ze、vhat rnay turn out to be a normative procedure in the future.
Stahl's approach may be justified for this type of extreme situation. In practice,however,it
aOpears mOre naturalto asstxme that even wllen no procedure has yet been deterHlined some
minimum set of agreements or norms should be a priori set to base the negotintiOn game
among thena to tnd lvhat may finally be developed into their cost allocation procedure. It
is in thねvery sense that Okada3)haS developed a``prescriptive―mpirical approach" o cost
allocation which intends to go halfway between the normative end and empirical end. frhere
certainly are natural situatiolas、vhich demand ths type of approach  The situations may
include(i)when some or all of participants fail to understand the imphcations and vandity
of a normative method such as SCRB or a galne theoretic method represented by WN and
PN;(1)when sOme or an are reluctant to accept the set of norms as it is although they may
anow some basic ones tO be retained, and(五1)Mttth a set Of norms proposed by the prOiect
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manager or some of the participants,they desire t0 0btain a deeper understanding of what
is ilnplied by the applcation of these norms to cost anocation or they rnay even intend to add
to the original set of nOrms. Very likely the situations may be compOunded. Okada3)haS
noted that a prescriptive‐elnp rical approach to cost anocation which deals with such a
situation otlght to serve for both educational and problenl finding ptlrposes By education is
meant an intention to get those ignorant acknowledge some normative wisdoln and
principles.  Problem findillg underhes a pOsition which anows for latitude to individual
experience,change and trial and error.
This sttdy extends on his former ttudy in the fol10wing points
(1)Otlr new approach desigtt tO incorporate a microcomputer in the procedure of cost
allocation as an aid Of supplying participants with infOrmatiOn and explanatiOns for the
ongoillg cost a■oca ion galning.
(2)The informatiOn is aH visuaHzed and colored to appear on the screen of a color display
unit linked with the■licrocomputer.
(3)The rational fOr employing a microcomputer(and nOt a large computer)is owing to(i)
econolny and(?)eaSiness and candiness with which tO gain an access to it and to develop
interactive dialogues with it.  This is increasingly true as conspicously high speed of
innovation in the microcornputer industry progrcxsses year by year,
(4)After conductillg experiments a ntlmber of times with participants seated before the
colnputer, we 、vill closely analyze the resdts froln both a macroscopic and microscopic
vie、vpoillts. This wiH bring on tO a systematic check Of the apphcability and lirnits of the
propcsed approach.
2. Design of Gaming
2.l Proble■n identified
Let tt asstlme that three cities nOw contemplate to undertake a joint water supply proiect.
Their prrnary concern is with ho、v to aHoca e the tatal costs. SO we have three players and
not more than that.We will limit the number of players to three because(i)three players
are the millimum condition fOr a coalition to be formed;(?)the displaying of information in
more than three dilnensions entails tech?cal difficulties, and (?)a three‐player galne is
considered the prototype of a coahtion galne. One may be anowed to go alone、vhich would
cost hirla what is termed as an individual cost Of attaining the goal, or he rnay contemplate
to go together with one of the rest to form a cOalition against the last one who is forced to
go alone. The cost of so doing is called a coalition cost or a ioint cost. The datum On all
of these costts to be estrlaated in advance is given in Table l.
2.2 WHcrocomputer system unplemented
With costs and functions taken into accOunt a choice has been made to irnplement the
Sharp MZ-80K2microcOmputer system which is composed of a(green cOmputer"(main
module), a dual floppy dsk,a dot printer,a cO10r mo?tor and interface units tO link them
together(see Fig。 1).The elatire system costs some l.3 milhon yen Or 5,400 US s.
Reports of the Faculty of Engineering,Tottori Universioy,Vol 13
INDIVIDUALCOALIT10NGRANDCOALIT10N
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
C(A8)=10
C(AC)= 8
C(BC)= 5
C(ABC)=10.6
(UNIT:108 yen)
Table l lnput Cost Datuln
Fig。l  μlicrocomputer System 11lustrated
2.3 hCini】mum mOrms built in
Depending on whether players go alone Or tOgether,basic norms which have been reduced
to minimum requirement are to be introduced in our approach. One is the self…evide ce
balance condition that a tOtal of cOsts assigned tO each be equal to the entire costs of the
grand coalition prOject to be participated by all three cities. If no coalition is formed,the
remaining condition is the principle of individual rationality which dictates that none of the
participallts be worse off by participating the grand prOieCt.Extension of this principle is
made to the case in which a coalition is cOntemplated by two Of the three,that is,the
principle Of grOllp rationanty Which prescribes that a group contemplating tO fOrrn a coalition
not be worse off by participating in the grand cOalition.
To formulate the above cOnditions in mathernatical terms:
Self‐evidence Condition:
ズれ十χD+χc=C(4BC)
Individual Rationality:
ズA≦C(4);ズβ≦C(B);χc≦C(C).
GrOttp Rationality:
ズAtt χβ≦C(4B)
・………………………………………………・・(2)
χD+ズc≦C(BC)
ズれ十ズc≦C(4C)
In the above tt denotes the cost to be allocated to city'(ケbeing 4,身or C)and c(ゲ)or c
(S)represents the costs of the participant S as specified by the syllabol parenthesized(S
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being 4島BC or AC)。
It is noted that the conection of the above three conditions gives the concept of core,a、v H
known concept from the cooperative garne theory as the basis of fairness and equity in
bargaining and negotiation. Since it is assumed that“going alone" nd``going together"are
mutually exclusive in our cost allocation galning and so only one of the two conditions,
individual or group rationality is set to hold,there is no guarantee for a compromise solution
to al、vays satisfy core,
Photo l Pre‐Gaming
G?dince
lnformation(1)
Photo 2 Pre‐Gaming
G?dance
lnformatiom(2)
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2,4 Pre‐ganling g?dance
By inviting three players to the game as the representatives of the three cities,we begin
with supplying players with some guiding infOrmation which includes(i)COst data and
possble coalition patterns,(?)description of some minimtlm norms to base the galne,i.e.
self‐e?dent condition,individual rationahty and group rationality with the concept of core
also illustrated for reference(see Phot(潟lto 3),and(i?)basic rdtt and pr∝edures for the
ga■ling(sec PhOtos 4 and 5)。
2.5 Gaming
Ganing starts by asking each of the players to choose between“going alone"and“going
together".  Supp∝e all chose to go alolle.  Then players are asked to specify their
“satisfactory level" for their share of the costs.  Since it is desiglled to keep them from
kno、ving what he others aspire as their satisfactory levels,they are asked to report to the
galning operator by baHot.
With the satisfactory levels thus fed in,the computer immediately tels them about what
the automatically reconciled solution is. If every player finds it acceptable,which is rather
unhkely in a very early stagc of the gaming,、ve termina e the gallning and this solution is
taken as their final compro■l se solutiOn. Other、vise、ve go on、vith the same procedure until
an agree to finalize the garning.
2.6 Theoretical basis and its for■lulation
Once satisfactory levels are specified by either individual players or a group of players
forming a coalition,the problem of findlag a(provisional)comromise soltltion may easily be
formulated as a multiobiect?e prOgramming probleln.
If no coantion is formed,the problern is、vrit en as:
〃滋紘 ″0/A
〃滋焼 力をズB
〃滋紘 力ιズc
subiect to
・………………………………………………………・・(4)
・………………………………………………………・。(5)
・………………………………………………………・・(6)
χA≦C(4);χB≦C(B);ズc≦C(C) ・………………………………………………・・(7)
ズA+ズβ十ズc=C(4BC) ・………………………・・(8)
where inequality cOnstraints cOme from indi?dual rationality withズA, 'fB andジFc and Cい九
crtt co and cr4Bのas defined before.
If a coahtion is fOrmed,there are two levels for the players in the grOup to go through in
reaching a(prOvisional)comprOHlise, With a coantion formed by,say,ィ4 and B,the level‐o e
problern is fOrmulated as:
ノ″励歩%″ι/A+XB・…………………………………………………・・(9)
Reports of
〃勿ゲ効力ιッ粍
subiect to
χA十ズB≦C(4B)
χc≦C(C)
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・…………Ⅲ…・―・…・………Ⅲ…Ⅲ………Ⅲ…・…・…・………・―・…Ⅲ…・…Ⅲ…l10
・ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … ・ ・ (11)
………………………………………………………………………………(121
.・ ………Ⅲ…・・中―●中●…Ⅲ…●―・中●…l141
|●●中●¨●…Ⅲ…・・―・…・…l151
…………Ⅲヽ・………………………………………………。(161
χれ十χ】十χc=C(4BC)・……………………………………………………………・(131
The first inequality condition of Equation(11)dictates that group ratiOnality should hold
for a cOalition陣二沙,whereas individual ratiOnality needs to hold for an individual player C
as expressed by the second inequality condition of Equation(12)。
On findng a pro、■sional cOmpro■lise solution for a coalition pェリand n individual player
C,as explained later,the leve卜tM〆o problern is tO deterHline hoM〆tO spht between theni the
COStS/AB aS aSsigned collectively to plaァersノ4 and B ontevel One.「rhis lower level problem
is played by the two,4 and B 、vho formed a cOalition in the upper One.
This is expresttd a3:
Subiect to
防 %減力ο‰
岨杭 ケ物″θ為
Xれ≦C(4);ズB≦C(β)
/4+χ∂=〆AD
Again,the inequality conditions of Equation(16)are the expression of individual rationality
to hold for∠4 and B.
2.7 Comprontise fと1(近ng algorithm
As is clear from the formulations above, the problem has been converted into a multi‐
Obiective progranllning problem,to which a variety of techniques have been so far developed
to locate a most acceptable solution(or satisficing solution),not an optirnal solution from a
single obieCtive vie、7pOint, Among many candidates has been sillgled out a technique of the
goal progranllning、vith an exphcit Asstkmption of L―shaped utility function, ′rhtt may easily
be advOcated by all the players who may be more hkely to colnprornise 、vhen they find
everyolle's goal better balanced than other、vise.
By“well_balanced"we rnean that the extent to which the achievement of one's objective
is remOte from his satisfactory levei needs to be as close as possible to the extellt to which
the achievemelat of the other's obiect?e is r mote from his(the other'sl satisfactory level.It
is noted that another level called a per■1 ssible evel is defined as the level the corresponding
goal ought to reach at least We take either individual or group rationality to stand for the
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pば■lissible level for each player or a group, respectively.
The underlyillg idea as graphed in Fig。 2 is t at the MreH‐balanced solution should lie,if
possible,precisely on the line connecting between the tMro points,one representillg each one's
satisfactory and pσ■lissible levels, otherwise it otlght to be as close as possible to the line
This line is termed as a``goal vector ''If one cannot kno、M「hich situation is to occur,linear
prograrrulling need〔 to b  made uGe of to calculate lvllat is regarded as a 、vel ―ba anced
solution, Since one may easily prove that only the former situation takes place for our three
dirnellsional proble■l as is clear from Fig。3,the solution is analytically identified with the
point which is the intersection of the goal vector and the plane for the self―evident tot 卜cost
balance condition,
In consequence a wel―balanced solution■v lich we conceive as a provisional compromise
solution is given by the fono、ving formuli:
If no cOahtion is formed,
勇L=伊十 (ス:/Σ λF)×(C(スβC)一澪 J】) fOrゲ=4, B and C,
whereえザ=Cr)一σどwith CのWhich is playerケ's illdividual cost taken as his permissible level
andすどrepresents his satisfactory level
lf a coalition is formed by 4 and B just by、vay of explanation,the level‐One aHocation is
given as:
XAB=昴B十{崩B/(崩Dtt λc)}×(C(4BC)―(昴D十テ))  ・………………………………19
for a coalitiOn aI沙
Xc=テ+(λc/(λABtt λc)}×(Cttβ C)―(昴,+兌))  ………………………………………Ⅲ¢0
(gA'9B)=(C(A),C(8))
feasible area
0
Fig。2 WeⅡ‐Bahnced Solution
Two‐Goal Space
………………。(181
Fig.3  COmprOmise sOlution Located
on ThrecDimensional Space
a compromise solution
(prOviSiOna])
(gA,9B,gc)satisfactory
On
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for the remaining individual C
With∂てAB given as suth,the leve卜t、vo anocation reads as:
えぢ=テ十(λど/ヌλど)×tttAB一澤どJ}  ……・…………………………………………………・・90
forケ=4 and B fOr the examole of 4 and B forming a coalition
2.7Ⅲ【an‐1■achinc interactive《近alogues
By prOgrarruning thtte formuli On thei micrOcOmputer and on feeding it Ⅵ/ th the dattxln
on the satisfactory levels specified by the players,the SolutiOn is instantanёously calculated
to appear on the screen,「r playσS can also have access to some other visual ilafOrmation
as iHtttrated byPhOtos6and 7.The picture shOwn in the formerphoto ilforms the players of
M〆here the solution is located and whetherit is in or out of core lf players want to keep track
of the series of their past provisional compromise solutions which they have so far not
Photo 6Provisional
Results Of
GOming On
Display(1)
Photo 7  Provisiomal
Results  Of
Gaming On
Display(2)
= 舞,I}
i(6.5,3.8矛   )
2(6.5,   ,▲.5)
3(6.と,4,2,   )
4く   ,4.2,1.1)
5(6.5,   P二・5)
6(   ,3.e,i_5)
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accepted in hOpe of finding a better one,the diagram as shown in the latter photo serves their
ptlrpcxse. The idea is to get the players seated before the computer and let them play with
the others by developing interactive dialogues 、、そith the rest of the participants with the
machine as the media of communication.
3. Results of Experiments
3.l Design of experunents
By thus developing a nlicrocomputer based infOrmation syste■l for the cost allocation
ga■ling, a total of 60 students were invlted to the forunl,thus producing the results of 20
cases. The studerlts,undergraduate or graduate students,come froln the Department of(,ivil
engineerillg,「rottori University, Each tilne three students were asked to be seated before the
computer with the author as the operator and referee for the gallaing. They were allo、ved to
play not more than eight rounds. The lilllit to eight rounds is younded on the assmption
that if three of al are allowed to try two courses of action, namely,going alone or going
together with someone,the number of possible outcOmes is 28=8.
If players fomd stiH hard to comprOmise within an a1lowed number Of eight rounds,they
were asked to rate each of their former provisional colnpromise solutions. This rating by
each player is reported only to the operator,、vho singles ut one of the solutions that is rated
“av∝agedly highest''by the participants.By“averagedly highest''is meant the solution for
、vhich the rating is averaged over the three players to rank highest.
In each round Of the galne the players were asked to fill out a questionnaire on the
folowing itemsI(1)the reasOn for either accepting or not accepting the ctlrrent provisional
compro■lise solution,(1)selection of courses of action,i e. goillg alone or going together;
:llit十哲cモ:十;早と,と!「 S
c言lπI品¬
?
?
??
?
Fig。4 Quclstionnaire
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and the latter bdng the case,with whomP,and(五i)Specification of one's satisfactOry level
(challgeable in eadi romd)(see Fig。 4).
Vヽhen the game is over, they 、vere questioned about(iv)the degree to which one's
understanding has improved of the key buntin allocation normaHties,and(v)the rating of
one's preference amOng a given set of reference methods of cost anocation,that is,SCRB,
Shapley Value,Nudeolus,Weak Nudeohs(WN)and Proportional Nucleolus(PN).
3.2 Analysis of results
l)patternization of results
Table 2 1ists the twenty cases of empirical results.For analytical convenience by dividing
the range of values intO three the final comproHlise values were classed into tttee categories,
“high" denOted by Fr (unfovorable), “ nedium'' denoted by ノ,イ, an“10w" denoted by L
(favorable). Table 3 and Fig.5 show the histOgrams of the final cmpromise values for the
three players,Study of this table immediately iltdicates that
(1)Players 4 and C Outrank B in the number of thOse whO finaHy accepted relatively high
Table 2 Empirical ResultsTable 3 Compro■lise Values Categorized
Case B C
5.817
5,745
6.065
5.900
5,723
5。970
5。937
5.620
5,900
5.802
5.649
6.084
5,934
5.658
5,927
5,709
5.851
5,381
5,911
5.548
3.553
3.687
3.362
3.500
3.756
3,316
3.675
3,747
3.494
3.659
3.689
3.327
3.577
3.767
3.688
3.637
3.508
3.919
3.685
3.791
230
168
173
200
121
313
988
233
206
139
262
188
089
175
988
254
241
299
003
261
(UNIT:108 Yen)
L:low value
前:medium
H:high
IIistograns of the  Distribution
of Compronlise SolutiOns
CAS E A B
M
2 M
H M
Zl M M
5 L
6 H L
7 H M L
H
M M
M M L
1 H H
L
M
H M
H L
M
L
H H
M L
L H
Fig。5
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a cost or relatively unfavorable an allocation.
(2)Comparatively,player B outranks playersノ生and C in the numb  ofthose who fan in the
■?ddle class
(3)As fOr players A and C the number of those who enioy relat?ely l w a costis th  smallest,
whereas it is relatively large for player B.
(4)Conectively players A and C Share a pattern of right―downward dis ribution,as against
B which is patternized by its cone―shaped d stribution。(4)To reinterprete,a rnicroscopic
feature of the results is characterized by seerningly favorable values for player B against∠4
and C.This lnay be justified by the fact that player B is in the stroltgttt pOsition to claim
a cost relatively low for hiln on the ground that the contribution of∠4 and C to their ioint
venture and the grand proiect in increasing econoH?c efficiencyis nOthing as compared to that
Of"乳as is clearly structured in the cost input datum in Table l.This lneans that the outlined
dintribution pattern of compromise values is deter■lined largely by the s ructure of the cost
input datum。(5)As far as a set of compromise values for players 4,B and C are concerned,
the pattern which occtxrS mOSt frequelatly has proved to be(rFA,LB,フ晩),indicating that 4,
B and C belong to class rtt L and M,respectively. Again,this reassures the general trend
of favorable players for a
2)Comparat?e nalysis
(1)For vehicle of comparison it might be of analytical interest to apply the above sttbolic
sy.stem to a set of he other cost allocation tech?qtles.Th(■we get Nucleolus=(FFA,LB,Lc),
WN=(FFA,LB,Ms,PN=(FFA,LB,FFcジ,Shapley value=(FFA,フyB,Lc,and SCRB=(FFA,'VB,
Lc). It folo、vs frorn this that an but scR13 and ShapleyValue share the general trend of
favorable results for a as seen frorla the above galning experirnents. ′rhe pattern which is
closest to otxr experrnental results has proved to be that of PN
(2)AnOther analytical interestis to examine whether initial solutions affect what they have
finamy agreed on This underhes our suspicion that much of the garne might be determined
by just a single F`puShing"player who can preempty the others by clailning exorbitantly
favorable a value for hilnself at the outset of the galning.A statistical test has been done to
exallline the significance of the differences between initial and final compromise solutions for
each player. It car been sho、vn that o statistical significance is gauged in the manner the
former values dewlate froni the lattero So、ve may conclude hat repetitive rounds of garning
helps playerslearn how they should act or react by forming a coalition、vher  necessa y,thus
eventuaHy converging onto a range of reasonable values, not、〃ithstanding some minor
exceptiott of extreme values.
3)Comparat?e nal邪ね         。
So far has been a macroscopic analysis of the resdtso We now turn our eyes to more
microscopic feattlres of the results. In anothor word we intend to take a closeup of the above
question:how rnuch player's bargainability counts in ga■lingo We base our analysis again on
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the questionnaire results.
We start with the definition of player's characteristics of``strong",“mediunl" nd``、veak''.
A“strOng"bargainer is defined to be a person who wants to have another round,hoping to
gain more even if he feels that the cttrrent solution is rather satisfactory for hirni or、vho
always finds any solution unacceptable as a final conapromise, or、vho immediately statts
feeling uIIsatisfactory、vith the current solution,if it turns out to be less favOrable for him
than the preceding one.
Likewise,by definitiOn,a``、veak"bargainer is a person lvllo is ready tO find some solution
acceptable in relat?ely e rly a stage and rushes to compromヽe by gi?ng up his DreSeltt
claina, Or who rushes to accept the presest solution even if he finds it not nec∝saril
so satisfactory.A“rnediunl"bergainer is defined to be the rest,neither weak or strong.
In the above are underlined those paragraphs which we can get track of from the
questionnaire. By applyilng theabove definitions to Our players,cach player in a gaming has
been marked with``S",``ЛF"Or `,″'' as shclwn in Table 4. Conaparison of this table、vith
Table 3 which lists the compronlise values categorized as rγr': `ク′''and Ъと'I leads to Fig. 6.
This figtxre shows the numttr of each player with a bargaining character categorized as rS':
`ク′"。r FFフレ″'against compromise values ranked as`7:亀7''or`z't A mere glance ofthis
igure shows that irrespect?e of player 4,B or c it is highly likely that those“strong"
bargainers tend to ellioy relatively“low''coStS(favorable values),wheFeaS those“weak"ones
end up with relatively“high"costs(ulafavorable values). This tendency may not be,however,
Table 4 Player's Characters Categorized
sistrong bargainer
M:medium
w:weak
CASE A C
1 ‖ M S
2 M W
3 M W
5 ‖ S
6 S S
7 H S 5
8 ‖
9 5 W
‖
S M
IW S S
M S
S S 5
M も
も M
W も
S
W M
も M
C
Compromise
value
H M L
〓
?
?
?
?
?
?
〓
?
?
?
， ?
??
?
?
?
?
3 1 8
2
l 3 4 8
7 6 7
B
ComprOmise
value
し
〓
?
?
?
?
?
﹇
〓
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
S 4 1 l 6
3 1 6
1 2
7 6 7
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Fig。 6 Comprorise Values vso Player's Characterねtics
Fig.7  Bargainer's Characterhtics Discrnlinated
so clear fOr thtte who fan in the category of“rnediunl". A statistical test has been done to
exanline this hypothesisi one's barga?ng character affects、vh t he will finally gain.
The result partially supports this hypothesis with a sig?ficance leve1 0f f?e percentith t s,
sig?ficance has been gauged between any two cases,one which、vas played by a“weak"ノ4
rB or c)and anOther played by a``strong"ッ4 rB Or C respectively),thOugh no significance
has been picked up bet、v en any two cases where one of the compared two players 、vas
found to be``rnediunl''. This fact is inustrated in Fig。 7.
To conclude we may fairly say that rnicroscopicany a cost anocation garning so defined is
subiect tO player's bargainabinty to a limited extelat,if we compare a particular outcome
with another.
4)Complementary analysis
By reference to the results of the post‐gaming questionnaires,some complementary analysis
htt been cOnducted to find the following:
(1)85 percent of those who had failed to understand the concept of core before they became
involved in the gaming,admitted that the imphcatiOn of the concept became clearer to them.
(2)80 percent of those 、vho finally gained the understanding of core found it a reasonable
condition for cost alocation.
(3)Accordillg to the ratilag of five other alternative cost aHocation inethods,SCRB has been
found to rank top,which is foIIowed by Shapley Value,then by PN,then byヽ|「N and finally
Compronlse
value
H L
l 6
1 1 2
1 5
7
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by Nucleolus.
(4)The most popular criterion employed by participants for so rating was the easiness to
understand and the least mathematical complexties、vhich entai a given method.
It rnight not be overstated that this easiness to use and understand attracts practitioners
and laylnen FRr thiS reason SCRB and Shapley Valye tend to be rated before the rest,This
may well explain why SCRB still gains so much popdarity for all flaws it entails.
It seems contradictory,however,thtt players rate both SCRB and Shapley Valuc(which
do not necessarily satisfy core)higher than the other core‐based tech?qtles,ev n ough they
supported core as a reasonable condition for cost allocation, This is exがlained partly by he
possibility that their understanding of core was not enough. Another reason may be that in
our example both SCRB and Shapley Value always happened to satisfy core,which means
that it seems vばy likely that either SCRB or Shapley Value could have、■olated core if we
had used a shght different example.
It shOuld be noted that all participants have felt that our cost allocatiOn galning is also
appropriate in terms of easiness tO use and understand ?笙any of theln have agreed that this
type of experlnental technique could serve the purpose of educating people to become more
famiharized with the problem of cost allocation,leading them up to the essential question of
``、vhat is fairness and oquity?".
3.3 SCRIl as part of ganling
Finally it might be of additional illterest to ref∝t  the fact tha  our prttcript?e―empirical
gaming approach offers an reillterpretation of SCRB, because the forrner colnprises the
latt∝  「rhat is,it rnay easily be demolastrated that the SCRB based solution is no more than
a special solution among a set of possible compronlise solutions for our gaHling. The point
to be made is the assmption that each player wl■ chose to go alone has agreed to take his
own“separable cost"as a satisfactory leve1 0ne's``separable cost"is defined as the cost of
the particular participant leaving the grand proiect Or as the marginal cost of adding hiln tO
the list of participarlts as the last one.
This as(剋mption which is called marginality principle may seem rather natural to players
with common sette and reasoning,because oth∝、vise he wOuld b forced to leave the grand
proJect,which in turn leaves hinュ、vith no choice but to go alone,、vhich、vould cost rnore than
his separable cost,  On substituting one's individual cost into his satisfactory levelす4 in
Equation(18),we get for player∠4
Xれ=昴十 λ4/(λね十 λBtt λc)X(C(4βC)―(勇十酔 十」c)}
=昴 十 1C(4)一昴 )/(C(4)一象 +C(B)― ヵ +C(C)一 σ 』
×(C(4BC)―(昴十昴十員)}
=SC(4)十(■B(4)/(RB(4)十RB(B)十RB(C)))
×(C(4BC)―(SC(4)+SC(B)+SC(C)))
…………………………・(181
………………………………Ⅲ…・・……1・・921
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which is precisely the allocation forrlaula of SCRB 、vi h each one's individual costs being
lesser than hるbenefits ln the above SC stands for one's separable cost and RB denotes One's
remaining benefit which is defined to be the difference between One's individual costs and
separable cOsts. Therefore it holds for ゲ=/4, 」9 and C thati
RB(ゲ)=C(ゲ)一SC(ゲ)=C(ケ)一σど ………ⅢⅢ…………………・―・…Ⅲ…` ―・……… ………。・・……i1231
It is clear that Equation(22)apphes for any participant other thanメ4.
The above fact indicates that our ne、v appro ch、vorks very wen for the purpose of gaining
further insight into(SCRB and offers a garne―theoretic reinte pretation of what is imphed by
the method. If participants so desire,they can take as their cost aHocation the SCRB based
solution for the ganing.
4。 Conclusion
ln this paper we have presented a prescriptive‐empirical app oach to cost allocation Ⅵrith
an aid Of a microcomputer based information system and have demOnstrated how well our
approach serves our purpose
A point of departure from conventional approaches was the awareness of the need among
practitioners and laymen fOr an advent of a new apprOach、vhich could coII■pleme t,nOt tO
say replace,any of the conventional methods or newly developed gallne―the retic m thods.
The new direction was intended to be somewhere between normative approaches which
include allnost all conventional methods and empirical approaches known by the name of
ga巨?ng.  W7hat destingl姐SheS Our prescriptive‐emp rical approach for an Ordinary type of
gattling was that the former is g?ded by the ■linilntlln normalities incorporated in the
gaming procedure.
Some major findiIIgs may be summarized as followま
(1)Despite minOr difttrences amolag dir∝ent a es,the outlined distribution pattern of
compronlise values is deter■lined larg ly by the structure of the input cost datunl,and not so
much by the bargainability of players.  This is very much owing to those basic norms
incorporated in the gaHling which guide much of the direction of the galllli屯, This explains
why the preserlted approach is caned a “prttcript ve―empirical" pproach, not sirllply an
empirical ap「roach or a garning.
(2)From a microscopic point of view,however,this is not necessarily the case. One's
bargaining power makes some difference  Thばefor we may say that players are givёn
lirnited free hand as long as they stay within the predeternined conditions incorporated in the
gallaing procedure.
(3)The nlicrOcomputer‐aided approach has proved to be very effective and hdpful in
educating people who are not faHlihar with cost allocation.  肝ヽery often people tend to
disagree with a given approach sirnply because they fail to gain a fun understandil■g ofit. By
so familiarizing theln with the essence of cost a1location people、vill be more likely to accept
it,as、vas precisely the case with our experilnents lt also serves for the ptlrpose of bringing
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up the practitioners to a rOund table before the cornputer to let them express what they
expect a method of cost allocation to be. rヽery likely they will come to learn that they have
ended up with contradicting not ordy the others but themselves. A glance of the track of their
outcomes which are colorfuny visualized on the screen、ll readily tell them about this. It
is in this very sette that our prescriptive―empirical approach is regarded as an education‐
oriented and problenl‐finding apprOach.
(4)By inCOrporating what has been agreed on through experilnentation into the gattling
procedure,we may expect to add to the normalities for guiding the garne,thus eventuany
leading closer to a more normative type of lnethodology.
With an benefits of our approach, there seems to be much room for extellsion and
improvement.A hst of technical difficulties to overcome includes(i)hOW to viSualize more
than hree dimensional information on the screen of a color monitor Hnked with a
microcomputer if more than tttee players are involved in the cost allocttion,and(?)hoW
to speed up the prOcttsing and display of inforコnation, and h w to verlay one image on
another in order to make the presentation of information more attractive and effective.
We could certainly overcome them with a larger scale of computer but our ma〕or concern
is ho、v to make it on a nlicrocomputer.  A remarkable speed of advancement in the
microcomputer industry seems to offer us a rather promising prospect.
Another concern of ours is to invite practitioners and managers experienced in the business
of cost aHocation to play the game by hemselves.  By accommodating their advice and
criticisln we may develop a more appHcable approach in line with the approach suggested
here.
A step for、vard has already been taken with some enocouraging fruits, 、vhich will be
presented in otlr forthcoming paper.
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